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*Poland in the Process of European Integration: Conditions and  
Course of the Campaign before the Accession Referendum*

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Polska w procesie integracji europejskiej: uwarunkowania i przebieg kampanii przed referendum akcesyjnym

ABSTRACT

The aim of this article is to analyze the main entities and course of the campaign before the accession referendum in Poland. The subjects of the analysis were legal acts, documents (including programs of political parties and various public entities and speeches of leaders), statistical data, and scientific studies. The research process involved in-depth analysis of documents and critical content analysis. The article was divided into several parts relating to Polish society's attitude towards EU accession; the Polish political scene after the parliamentary elections in 2001; assumptions of the information campaign; the legal basis of the referendum campaign; referendum campaigns conducted by the president, government, Democratic Left Alliance, Labor Union, Civic Platform RP, Law and Justice, Citizens' Initiatives and Movements, League of Polish Families, Self-Defence RP, and Polish People's Party.

**Keywords:** referendum, European Union, referendum campaign

INTRODUCTION

Negotiations regarding the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the structures of the European Union were held in two groups: Luxembourg and Helsinki. Poland, along with the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovenia, and Cyprus, belonged to the Luxembourg group [Marczewska-Rytko 2015]. These states commenced accession negotiations as a consequence of the European Council's decision in a session in Luxembourg in December 1997. Negotiations began in March 1998 and ended in December 2002. According to the Polish Constitution, a statute granting

consent for ratification of an international agreement shall be passed by the Sejm by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies, and by the Senate by a two-thirds majority vote in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Senators [Konstytucja Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 2 kwietnia 1997 r., Article 90, para. 2]. According to Article 90, para. 3, this ratification may also be passed by a nationwide referendum. Any resolution with respect to the choice of procedure for granting consent to ratification shall be taken by the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament) by an absolute majority vote taken in the presence of at least half of the statutory number of Deputies (Article 90, para. 4). If the agreement is ratified by a referendum, its result is binding, if more than half of the number of those having the right to vote have participated in it (Article 125, para. 3).

In accordance with the resolution adopted by Sejm on April 17, 2003, regarding the accession treaty, it was decided to hold a nationwide referendum [Uchwała Sejmu Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej z dnia 17 kwietnia 2003 r.]. The second paragraph contains the text of the question: "Do you consent to the accession of the Republic of Poland to the European Union?" In the third paragraph, the referendum was scheduled for June 8 and held on June 7 and 8, 2003, respectively. The condition for the referendum to be considered binding was to obtain more than 50% of the votes from among all persons entitled to vote. Therefore, for supporters of Poland's accession to the European Union, it was important that voter turnout was above 50% of all those eligible to vote.

The aim of this article is to analyze the conditions and course of the campaign before the accession referendum in Poland. It should be emphasized that the political elites in power at that time supported Poland's accession to EU structures. Therefore, all functional solutions were sought to achieve the intended goal. The subjects of the analysis were legal acts, documents (including programs of political parties and various public entities and speeches of leaders), statistical data, public-opinion polls, and scientific studies. The research process involved an in-depth analysis of legal acts, documents, and reports; critical analysis of public discourse; and critical content analysis. The article was divided into several parts relating to Polish society's attitude towards EU accession, the Polish political scene after the parliamentary elections in 2001, assumptions of the information campaign, legal basis of the referendum campaign, referendum campaigns conducted by the president, government, Democratic Left Alliance, Labor Union, Civic Platform, Law and Justice, Citizens' Initiatives and Movements, League of Polish Families, Self-Defence, and Polish People's Party.

#### POLISH SOCIETY TOWARDS POLAND'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION

The issue of public support was important for Poland's integration with the EU's structures of the European Union. Poland's membership in the European Union was a strategic point in its policy. Therefore, support for integration has been the

subject of public opinion research since 1994 [Sasińska-Klas 2004: 111–126]. As public opinion polls conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center in Warsaw in June 1994 showed, support for activities aimed at Poland's accession to the European Union was high. It accounted for 77% of all respondents. In 1995, support was around 72%, and in 1996, it was 80%. In subsequent years, there was a visible decline in support for the integration process. Since 1999, the number of opponents in the integration process has increased, ranged from 22 to 30% of all respondents [Poparcie dla integracji Polski z Unią Europejską, marzec 2002]. Support for Poland's accession to the structures of the European Union compared to other candidate countries is presented in Table 1.

Table 1. The level of support for accession to EU structures

Country	Support in 1996–1997 (%)		Support in 2000–2001 (%)		Support in 2002 (%)	
	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
Czech Republic	43–49	11–15	38–45	14–22	41–51	17–36
Estonia	29–35	14–17	38–54	27–59	38–54	28–38
Hungary	47–56	9–15	54–70	10–15	72–76	6–10
Latvia	34	13	38–53	31–37	37–42	38–43
Lithuania	35–40	5–13	47–50	20–21	50–57	17–25
Poland	63–80	5–7	44–60	26	53–67	22–25
Slovakia	46–62	9	65–76	10–16	68–69	10–17
Slovenia	47–57	14–18	42–63	22	55–56	27–28

Source: Author's own study based on [Albi 2004: 11].

As the data in Table 1 show, public opinion in many countries remained skeptical about accession to the EU [*Argumenty zwolenników i przeciwników integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, luty 2002; *Optymizm i pesymizm w myśleniu o efektach integracji europejskiej*, luty 2003]. The last published before referendum election polls indicated that 68% of respondents were in favor of Poland's accession to the European Union, while 22% were against it [*Spoleczne poparcie dla integracji z Unią Europejską*, kwiecień 2003; *Poparcie dla integracji z Unią Europejską na cztery tygodnie przed referendum*, maj 2003].

Public opinion surveys were also conducted on the benefits and concerns of the integration process. Among the main benefits, those surveyed by the Public Opinion Research Center indicated reduced unemployment and increased chances of finding a job (26%), benefits to the economy, and better prospects for economic development (19%). Improving material living conditions, improving life, improving quality of life (18%), opening borders (5%), benefits for the countryside and agriculture (4%), beneficial influence on internal and public affairs, running the country, political affairs (3%), and common currency (2%) [*Argumenty zwolenników i przeciwników integracji Polski z Unią Europejską*, luty 2002]. Supporters of the integration process also pointed out that it is impossible to stand aside when Europe is uniting (12%), there is no alternative to integration (10%), there will be better prospects for young

people, the next generations (7%), and it will create hope for overcoming the crisis (4%) [*ibid.*].

Opponents of the integration process drew attention to economic issues. Concerns were expressed that Poland was not prepared for accession to the EU (20%); regarding the loss of sovereignty, purchase by foreign capital, enslavement of Poles, and treatment of them as cheap labor (20%); Poland will not benefit at all (18%); Poland will be a second-class country (12%) [*ibid.*]. Opponents also argued that integration would have an adverse impact on Polish agriculture, economy, industry, trade with EU countries, labor markets, unemployment levels, and people's material living conditions.

#### THE POLISH POLITICAL SCENE AFTER THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS IN 2001

As a result of parliamentary elections held on September 23, 2001, seven electoral committees exceeded the required electoral threshold and were elected to parliament. As shown by the data in Table 2, the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Labor Union achieved electoral success. The level of support was 41.04%. At that time, support for the Civic Platform was 12.68%, Self-Defence RP was 10.2%, and Law and Justice was 9.5%.

Table 2. Results of the parliamentary elections in Poland in 2001

Election date and turnout	Name of the election committee	Number of votes in %	Number of seats
23.09.2001	Democratic Left Alliance – the Labor Union	41.04	216
	Civic Platform	12.68	65
	Self-Defence RP	10.20	53
	Law and Justice	9.50	44
46.29%	Polish People's Party	8.98	42
	League of Polish Families	7.87	38
	German Minority	0.36	2

Source: Author's own study based on data from the National Electoral Commission.

The main political parties in Poland supported the EU accession [Assumption for an information campaign before the European referendum "Poland in the European Union"; Kuźelewska 2003: 38–50; Piasecki 2004: 147–170; Jonczek, Kempisty 2003/2004: 197–219; *Tak dla Polski: referendum akcesyjne*, 2004; Nikolski 2005; Smolińska et al. 2012: 355–356; Marczevska-Rytko 2014: 77–94; Marczevska-Rytko 2010: 15–29]. Eurosceptic movements were generally marginal [Nalewajko 2003: 97–132]. Of the political parties present in parliament, only the League of Polish Families remained skeptical about Poland's integration, while Self-Defence and the Polish People's Party presented an undecided position [Cyran 2010; Mar-

inkowski 2014; Indraszczyk 2004]. Table 3 shows level of support for EU accession among electorates of individual political parties.

Table 3. Level of support for EU accession among the electorates of individual political parties

Electorate of political parties	Supporters (%)	Opponents (%)	Undecided (%)
Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland	99	0	1
Democratic Left Alliance	90	5	5
Polish People's Party	82	17	1
Law and Justice	77	16	7
Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland	48	30	22
League of Polish Families	30	60	10

Source: *Poparcie dla integracji na cztery tygodnie przed referendum akcesyjnym. Komunikat z badań*, opracowała B. Roguska, Warszawa 2003.

Generally, based on the data presented in Table 3, it can be concluded that among the parties, supporters of the Civic Platform declared the greatest support for integration. Supporters of accession also included the vast majority of potential voters of the Democratic Left Alliance, Polish People's Party, and Law and Justice. A favorable attitude towards Poland's membership in the Union European Union was also declared by a large number of Self-Defense supporters. The opposition to integration dominated the electorate of the League of Polish Families.

It is important that the turnout in the 2001 parliamentary elections, just over 46% of all those entitled to vote, was not optimistic in the context of the planned accession referendum. Similarly, experience with turnout in previous referendums may have raised concerns about exceeding the required threshold of 50% for the referendum result to be binding. As a reminder, in the national referendum of February 18, 1986, the turnout was 32.4% and in the constitutional referendum of May 25, 1997, it was 42.86%. Therefore, various entities that participated in the campaign before the accession referendum encouraged citizens to vote.

#### ASSUMPTIONS OF THE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN

An information campaign referred to all activities aimed at providing information on the functioning of the European community and the integration activities of individual countries. The assumptions of the information campaign were included in the document: "Poland in the European Union". Assumptions of the information campaign before the European Referendum [„*Polska w Unii Europejskiej*”. *Założenia kampanii informacyjnej*]. We could read in it: "return to Europe was one of the motives accompanying the establishment of the Third Polish Republic. All subsequent governments have worked toward integration, and the current government of the Republic of Poland has made it one of its main priorities".

The document stated that the results of the referendum would depend on factors such as the position of political forces, economic moods, trends and forecasts, or current political events. Attention was paid to the method of preparation and the nature of the discussion regarding individual decisions of the government and parliament. Other factors influencing the referendum results included the intensity of the referendum campaign and how pro-EU and anti-EU arguments were used. The authors of this document discussed the “degree of wear and tear” in these arguments. The importance of the degree of clarity of choice was emphasized, arguing that during the debate, there may be an increase in the sense of chaos, disorientation, and clarity of the choice. This situation could result in a significant decline in attendance.

The authors of this document attached great importance to voters’ sense of subjectivity. They rightly pointed out that “doubts regarding the conditions of accession may be strengthened or weakened by the assessment of the chances for their improvement in the longer term of membership. Clear signs indicate that Poland will be able to shape the conditions of its presence in the Union and influence their improvement” [*ibid.*]. A similar significant impact on voting results was attributed to the conditions of holding the referendum. It was emphasized that weekend trips could be expected during the project. Therefore, the fulfillment of the condition for the validity of the referendum, that is, obtaining a 50% turnout, was questionable. It was postulated that the conditions related to the referendum would facilitate participation.

The information campaign was conducted by various state institutions, including the Office of the Plenipotentiary, the Office of the Committee for European Integration, chaired by Danuta Hübner, Regional European Information Centers, Integration Offices established in each voivodeship office, Regional Development Agencies, radio and television established in January 2003, at the Chancellery of the Prime Minister, and the Office for the European Referendum headed by Lech Nikolski. In addition to information materials about the European Union published in the press, radio and television, posters, and advertising boards were used and placed in post offices, local government units, cooperative banks, and healthcare facilities. Information programs were implemented for entrepreneurs of *Your company in the EU* and *Agronfo* for rural residents. Government agencies printed approximately 13 million copies of various folders and 8 million leaflets, 300,000 booklets *Poland in the European Union*, and over a million copies of the brochure *Poland in the EU from A to Z* [Piasecki 2004: 156]. Over 50 one-minute advertising spots *Union without secrets* led by Wołoszański were also ordered.

#### FORMAL AND LEGAL DIMENSION OF THE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The referendum campaign aimed to convince citizens to take a specific position in the referendum by various entities authorized to vote at a strictly designated time before the referendum. Unlike the information campaign, the referendum campaign

was subject to the Referendum Act 2003 [Ustawa z dnia 14 marca 2003 r. o referendum ogólnokrajowym]. Under Article 37, a referendum campaign was defined as a presentation of their positions by citizens, political parties, associations, foundations, and other entities on the matter submitted to the referendum.

The duration of the campaign was clearly defined in Article 38 of the Act [*ibid.*]. It started on the day of announcing the resolution of the Sejm (or the resolution of the President of the Republic of Poland or the resolution of the Speaker of the Sejm), ordering a referendum and ending 24 hours before the day of voting. Pursuant to Article 40, the legislator prohibited conducting a referendum campaign in the workplace in a way that would disrupt their functioning [*ibid.*]. It prohibited conducting a referendum campaign in government and local government administration offices and in courts, in military units and other units subordinated to the Minister of National Defense and Civil Defense units, and in barracked units subordinate to the minister responsible for internal affairs. The legislator also prohibited organizing games of chance and competition during the referendum campaign in which one could win cash prizes or items of significant value. Similarly, the service and delivery of alcoholic beverages were prohibited.

Pursuant to Article 41, from the end of the referendum campaign until the end of voting, it was prohibited to publicize the results of public opinion polls regarding the expected behavior of voters in the referendum and the results of the referendum. Places in which posters, slogans, and leaflets were allowed were clearly indicated. Similarly, places where it was prohibited were listed (Article 43). Article 44 presented the procedure to be followed in the event that the materials distributed in the campaign, including posters, leaflets, slogans, and statements, contained false information. Entities participating in the referendum campaign were obliged to inform by whom they were paid and from whom all publications they published in the printed press, radio, and television came (Article 46). Information on financing the referendum campaign was included (Article 47).

Entities authorized to conduct the referendum campaign on radio and television were indicated (Article 48). Political parties were mentioned (the concerned parties that, in the last elections to the Sejm before the referendum, received at least 3% of valid votes cast on district lists nationwide or in relation to political parties included in electoral coalitions – 6%). In addition to political parties, such campaigns can be conducted by deputies, senators, or parliamentary clubs. The condition was the association, one year before the decision to order a referendum, of “deputies or senators elected from among the candidates proposed by the voters’ election committee, and these deputies or senators constituted more than half of the composition of these clubs” [*ibid.*]. The possibility of conducting campaigns on radio and television was granted to associations or other social organizations that were formally registered at least one year before the decision on the referendum was made, operated in Poland, and conducted activities included in the statutory objectives related to the subject of the referendum. In addition, campaigns on radio and television were planned for

foundations (after meeting strictly defined requirements) and proxies (Article 63, para. 3).

Pursuant to Article 51 of the Act, “from the 21<sup>st</sup> day before the referendum date until the end of the referendum campaign, Polish Television and Polish Radio broadcast referendum broadcasts of authorized entities at their own expense in national and regional programs”. The total dissemination time of referendum broadcasts was also clearly indicated. It amounted to “in nationwide programs – 25 hours on Polish Television, including up to 5 hours on TV Polonia, and 45 hours on Polish Radio, including up to 8 hours in a program intended for foreign countries” and in each regional program – 15 hours in Polish Television and 20 hours on Polish Radio [*ibid.*; Rozporządzenie KRRiT z dnia 12 sierpnia 2003 r.]. The time allocated to the dissemination of referendum broadcasts was equally divided between authorized entities (Article 52). The order in which referendum broadcasts were broadcast was determined by drawing lots conducted in the presence of representatives of authorized entities no later than the 23<sup>rd</sup> day before the referendum date (Article 53).

The basic goals of the referendum campaign included making citizens aware of the importance of the decisions taken in the referendum and mobilizing them to vote so that the turnout exceeded 50%. These goals were intended to be achieved through activities such as mass events, educational activities, meetings of citizens with political and social circles, creating opportunities for them to participate in the pre-referendum campaign, creating a European information system (information points in municipalities, publications, hotlines, the Internet, teletexts), marketing campaigns, or cooperation with the media.

The referendum campaign was led by the president, government, political parties, associations, foundations, and other non-governmental organizations [Lewanowicz 2003; Gacki, *Na 5 minut przed referendum; Kampania referendalna*; Smolińska et al. 2012: 355–356]. Generally, we can distinguish between three groups of entities conducting the referendum campaign: supporters of Poland’s accession to the European Union, opponents of Poland’s entry into the European Union, and political parties presenting undecided positions on accession.

#### THE PRESIDENTIAL REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The main slogan of the presidential campaign was “YES for Poland”. During the inauguration of the presidential campaign in Płock on April 25, 2003, Aleksander Kwaśniewski emphasized that voting against Poland’s accession to the EU essentially meant “condemning Poland to a political, economic, and social vacuum” [*Aleksander Kwaśniewski zainaugurował w Płocku kampanię przed unijnym referendum*].

Activities undertaken during the campaign included meetings with farmers, foreign investors, young people, local government officials, students, commune heads, and mayors. The President participated in events organized, among others,



in Gronów and Toruń (April 26), Ciechocinek and Osiećiny (May 2), Jędrzejów (May 5), Bielsko-Biała (May 6), Kalisz (May 7), Gorzów Wielkopolski (May 8), Rybczewice (May 11), Olsztyn (May 12), Białystok (May 13), Bochnia (May 15), Słupsk (May 16), Drawsko Pomorskie (May 21), Rzeszów and Kraków (May 24), Maurzyce (May 25), Głogów (May 26), Kędzierzyn Koźle (May 28), Gniezno (June 2) [*Kampania prezydencka; Tak dla Polski. Referendum Europejskie*].

As part of the campaign, the president took part in the “Toruń in the European Union” forum, in the opening of an internet workshop in Rybczewice, in the “I am European” debate, in the naming of a junior high school in Słupsk after Robert Schuman, in an air picnic in Góraszka, and in crossing the gate to Europe in Głogów, in the opening of the European College building in Gniezno, in the opening of the 10<sup>th</sup> Polish European Meetings, in a meeting with the creators and actors of TV series, in the ceremonial inauguration of the Young Farmers’ Bicycle Rally to Brussels.

During the meeting in Toruń on April 26, 2003, the President characterized Poland’s situation on the eve of the referendum: “No one will wait for Poland to decide. Nine candidate countries will join the EU, followed by Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey in the following years. Poland could not be found in the European Black Hole” [*Kampania prezydencka*]. Referring to farmers’ concerns, he said, “Farmers will benefit from direct payments and other forms of aid. There is no such program for any other professional group” [*ibid.*]. During the meeting in Warsaw on May 10, 2003, the President placed the issue of accession in a broader historical and socio-political context: “We have an exam in front of us and history will judge us [...] An accession referendum is a chance that a nation receives once every few centuries. Poles won this chance thanks to the courage of ‘Solidarity’, the common sense of the ‘Round Table’, and the consistency of reforms. Let’s do everything to take advantage of this opportunity” [*ibid.*].

#### THE GOVERNMENT REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The government campaign was conducted under the slogan “YES I vote”. During a meeting at the National Library on May 9, 2002, Prime Minister Leszek Miller referred to the importance of the campaign before the accession referendum: “It concerns our fate, individual and national. Therefore, we should be prepared as much as possible to make a decision. The government’s information campaign is intended to serve this purpose [...]” [*Wystąpienie premiera Leszka Millera*].

Government representatives took part in meetings in Gdańsk, Lublin, Wrocław, Gorzów Wlkp., Olsztyn, Ostróda, Szczytno, Kętrzyn, Łódź, Łask, Legionowo, Nowy Dwór Mazowiecki, Rzeszów, Poznań, Białystok, Opole, Pyrzyce, Kielce, Gryfino, Gdańsk, Bydgoszcz, Katowice, Wrocław, Ruda Śląska, Zabrze, Międzyzlesie, Sandomierz, Żąbkowice Śląska, Kamieniec Żąbkowicki, Karnity, Giżycko, Szczecin, Siedlce, Poznań, Obejzierz, Legnica, Sieradz, Żelów, Narewka, Głuchołazy, Przas-

nysz, Sulechów, Spała, Zielona Góra, Obrazów, Opatów, Chojnice, Raciechowice, Sitno, Kraków. They often visited the same town several times and met various social and professional groups [*Kampania rządowa*].

During the meeting in Warsaw on May 10, 2003, the Prime Minister, encouraging people to participate in the referendum and vote for accession, said: “Don’t let anyone slam the door in your face or say ‘no’ to your chance, aspirations and happy future” [*ibid.*]. In turn, Danuta Hübner argued at the meeting on June 2 in Warsaw: “We need to talk to people about the fact that it is their responsibility, their duty to speak out on important matters” [*ibid.*].

#### THE DEMOCRATIC LEFT ALLIANCE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The Democratic Left Alliance undertook activities under the slogan “Poland in the European Union. Yes!”. Regarding the Alliance’s strategy, its spokesman Jerzy Wenderlich commented on the reference to family symbolism, the opinions of Poles, and the summit in Copenhagen. The campaign was to be launched with a nationwide TV spot showing that “a new quality of life is being created for Poland” [*Kampania referendalna w mediach publicznych*]. He emphasized the importance of a radio campaign focused on convincing Poles to participate in the referendum [*ibid.*].

The campaign in the regional media was to be of a diversified nature: in regions with a predominance of people with a positive attitude towards the EU, it focused on encouraging participation in the referendum, while in regions with a predominance of people skeptical about the EU, it focused on the benefits resulting from integration with the EU. The SLD campaign supported government actions. The leaders of this party participated in meetings in, among others, Leszno, Katowice, Łódź, Prudnik, Białystok, Głuchołazy, and Poznań.

#### THE LABOUR UNION REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The Labour Union ran a campaign under the slogan “Europe-Union-Labour”. As stated by UP spokesman Bartłomiej Morzycki, the intention was to show the campaign among the people [*ibid.*]. In the spirit of the slogan of a million shaking hands, party representatives intended to appear “in squares, talk to people, hand out leaflets, convince people to join the Union” [*ibid.*].

At the meeting inaugurating the referendum campaign in Kalisz on April 27, 2003, Marek Pol encouraged support for Poland’s accession to the EU: “Opponents tell us that we will be deprived of many rights that foreigners will buy us out. All this is not true, we will not lose the right to eat *bigos*, black pudding and *krupniok* [...] We want the EU to be a labor union for Poland, which will enable us to overcome unemployment [...] Your future is now in your hands” [*Kampania Unii Pracy*]. In

turn, in Głuchołazy, he encouraged people to participate in the referendum: “On June 7–8, let’s go to the polls, vote for, let’s support integration with the European Union. Let’s support the work of coming to Poland” [*ibid.*].

#### THE CIVIC PLATFORM REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The Civic Platform took action under the slogan “Europe is our chance. Poland is our home”. The aim of the Platform’s activities was to show that not only political elites but also millions of Poles strive for Poland’s integration with the EU [*Kampania referendalna w mediach publicznych*]. As Jacek Protasiewicz emphasized, the campaign will be supported by actor Robert Gonera, musician Paweł Kukiz and party leaders: Donald Tusk, Zyta Gilowska, Jan Rokita and Andrzej Olechowski [*ibid.*].

At a meeting in Sopot on April 27, 2003, Donald Tusk said:

We are here to wake up Poles. Not to agitate. So that Poles understand that on June 7 and 8 they should decide their own fate [...] Nothing worse will happen in Poland than in Poles’ indifference to the future. That is why the slogan of our manifestation is: “Let’s wake up!” regardless of the extent to which political views or views on the EU divide us. Because we can and must lead Poland through this important historical time [...] A “no” vote will be more valuable than staying at home. I convince opponents to go and confront their views with ours in a referendum. [*Sopot: manifestacja zwolenników UE*]

#### THE LAW AND JUSTICE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

Law and Justice ran a campaign under the slogan “Strong Poland in Europe”. The aim of these activities was to develop a slogan. As the party’s spokesman Adam Bielan emphasized, the TV clips will refer to the poster with a crowned eagle and the slogan “Strong Poland in Europe” and the name Law and Justice [*Kampania referendalna w mediach publicznych*]. The people who appeared in the PIS spots were the party’s president Jarosław Kaczyński and deputy leader Kazimierz Michał Ujazdowski [*ibid.*].

Inaugurating the referendum campaign on April 27, 2003 in Warsaw, Jarosław Kaczyński emphasized: “We want the nation to decide about Poland’s entry into the European Union because we want a strong Poland [...]. Whether we like this, the European Union has an impact on our economic situation. This has a significant impact. [...] This is the choice: either this influence is one- or two-sided. I guess that every reasonable citizen must answer unequivocally; this influence should be two-sided” [*Jarosław Kaczyński: „Silna Polska w Europie”*]. During his visit to Konin on May 29, 2003, Kaczyński, encouraging people to participate in the referendum and vote yes, said: “In the EU, Poland will have almost as much influence on the

decision-making processes as Germany, France, England and Italy. Only two votes less. It is a powerful asset. This counts a lot. It would be a great imprudence to give up this opportunity. It would simply be giving up a big opportunity for the nation” [Jarosław Kaczyński: „Polska w Unii stanie się europejskim mocarstwem”].

#### THE CITIZENS’ INITIATIVES AND MOVEMENTS REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The Citizens’ Initiative YES in the referendum undertook activities under the slogan “YES in the referendum”. It united the business community (Confederation of Private Employers Lewiatan), media, advertising companies, advertising companies (Association of Advertising Agencies), and non-governmental organizations (Schuman Foundation, Unia & Polska) [*Referendum akcesyjne*].

In the Appeal of the Citizens’ Initiative to non-governmental organizations we read: “The European referendum has a similar importance to the memorable elections of 1989 – argued the creators of the Initiative – So let’s mobilize supporters to declare their support for Poland in Europe Let’s not link our involvement with current politics, let’s not leave decisions about the future of our country solely in the hands of politicians” [*Apel do organizacji pozarządowych o udział w Inicjatywie Obywatelskiej Tak w Referendum*]. Henryka Bochniarz, at a meeting in Warsaw on June 4, 2003, emphasized the following issues: “The business community I represent knows that Poland’s accession to the EU means more capital, foreign investments, and work abroad” [*Kampania Inicjatywy Obywatelskiej Tak w referendum*].

The campaign of the Citizens’ Movement “Karta Przyszłości” and the Blok Senat 2001 Club was held under the slogan “You are a Pole, You are a European. You want a strong and prosperous Poland. Part of the referendum vote YES”. During the inauguration of the Movement’s activities, one of its signatories, Katarzyna Skórzyńska, characterized the goals of the activities undertaken as follows: “The goal is not only to persuade Poles to participate in the referendum and vote for joining the EU. It is equally important to prepare Poland for membership in United Europe through meetings with representatives of local authorities of municipalities and cities throughout Poland” [*Kampania Ruchu Obywatelskiego „Karta Przyszłości” i Klubu Blok Senat 2001*].

#### THE LEAGUE OF POLISH FAMILIES REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The League of Polish Families ran a campaign under several slogans: “Always Poland!”, “No to betrayal”, “No to the EU!”. The League of Polish Families’ activities aimed to encourage participation in the referendum and vote against Poland’s accession to the EU. As Roman Giertych emphasized, the campaign included information about prices in the EU and the export ban [*Kampania referendalna w mediach*].

*publicznych*]. In his opinion, voting against accession would be an objection to government policy [*ibid.*].

An expression of opposition to Poland's entry into the European Union was the March of Independence that took place on the streets of Warsaw on May 1, 2003. The slogans appeared: "We do not want another partition of Poland or its colonization". Roman Giertych argued that "integration with the EU has the face of Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Leszek Miller, whose government enjoys 4% support. You served the Soviets, and now you will serve Brussels. We choose Poland. We fought for the independence of Poland, not Europe" [*LPR przeciwko wejściu Polski do UE*, 1.05.2003].

During the Schuman Parade in Warsaw on May 10, 2003, representatives of the LPR protested against EU accession: "If there is no place for God in the EU, there is no place for Poles either"; "EU – No, Poland – Yes", "Yesterday Moscow, today Brussels", "It is better to have lower taxes than to pay contributions in Brussels" [*Europarada*]. "Let us not be deceived. We are an entity in Europe, and they want to make us an object in the EU [...] No count on a good job. They need us there, but for cleaning, for washing the car", said Zygmunt Wrzodak in Głuchołazy [*Kampania Ligii Polskich Rodzin*].

#### THE SELF-DEFENCE REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

Self-Defence ran a campaign under the slogan "European Union? The choice is yours". During the referendum broadcasts, the party was represented by its leader Andrzej Lepper. As he emphasized, the Self-Defense campaign was to focus on "threats, about the conditions under which we should join the Union, about the fact that they are unfavorable for Poland, that there is no chance for us to use the production capacity of our industry and agriculture, about threats to young people that it is not true that there are jobs for them there because they themselves have problems with unemployment" [*Kampania referendalna w mediach publicznych*]. He also stated that "Self-Defense is in favor of the EU, but not on these terms" [*ibid.*].

On May 24, 2003, the chairman of Self-Defence in Nysa, Stanisław Petryszyn in Głuchołazy, drew attention to the uncertainty related to accession: "The European Union carries threats because we are not told about everything that awaits us. Only half of these are known. Let us consider whether we want to live under this uncertainty" [*Samoobrona: UE zagrożeniem dla Polski*].

Some researchers place Self-Defence among political parties presenting undecided positions on accession. They claim that Self-Defence did not reject the idea of accession, but rejected Poland's accession to the EU as unfavorable [Marcinkowski 2014: 241]. Some researchers have expressed the opinion that the statements of the leaders of Self-Defence clearly indicate this party's anti-integration approach [Piasecki 2004: 154–155; Cyran 2010: 256].

## THE POLISH PEOPLE'S PARTY REFERENDUM CAMPAIGN

The official campaign of the Polish People's Party began on April 27. During the campaign before the accession referendum, the Polish People's Party emphasized – similarly to its previous documents and speeches – the issue of ensuring appropriate conditions for the functioning of Polish agriculture within the economies of the European Union countries [Indraszczyk 2004: 335–346; Swacha 2019]. The final decision to support the Polish People's Party for voting “yes” in the accession referendum was made by the party's Supreme Council on May 10, 2003 [Uchwała Rady Naczelnej Polskiego Stronnictwa Ludowego z 10 maja 2003 r.].

## CONCLUSIONS

Several conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, Compared with the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Poland was in the middle of the table in terms of the number of supporters and opponents of accession to the European Union. In Poland, a high turnout exceeding the 50% threshold was an important requirement for a binding referendum result. Experience at that time showed that turnout may not exceed the required threshold. For this reason, a two-day referendum vote was established, an information campaign was conducted about the European Union and the conditions of Poland's membership in the EU structures, and various entities that participated in the campaign before the accession referendum encouraged citizens to vote.

Second, during the referendum campaign, large-scale mass and educational events were organized, as well as meetings with residents of many towns, as well as with various social and professional groups. A European information system was created. The campaign before the accession referendum was conducted by many entities, including the president, government, political parties, and non-governmental organizations. The vast majority of political forces supported this accession. Therefore, it was important in the public message to refer to arguments that would convince the public to vote for accession. Both supporters and opponents of accession sought to make society aware of the importance of decisions taken in the referendum.

Third, supporters used various arguments in the campaign prior to the accession referendum. The president emphasized the historical significance of the decisions of Polish society and historic opportunities. He also tried to dispel the fears of various social groups. Government representatives headed by Leszek Miller raised the importance of accession to the future of the country. Accessions were presented as a great opportunity for Poland and for the future. Representatives of the SLD who supported the government's actions spoke of a similar spirit. The Labour Union campaign included actions aimed at alleviating society's fear and showing the benefits of accession. The Civic Platform campaign also emphasized the opportunity for

Poland to join EU structures. Law and Justice created the image of a strong Poland in the European Union. It has been argued that Poland is an important entity in the European Union, such as Germany, France, England, and Italy. The campaign of civic initiatives and non-governmental organizations emphasized the benefits in the form of access to capital, investment, and work.

Fourth, the League of Polish Families had a decidedly negative attitude towards the EU during the campaign. Their focus was on ideological, economic, and social threats. In the campaign before the referendum, Self-Defence and the Polish People's Party presented an ambivalent attitude towards the EU. The accession was supported by Self-Defence on the one hand. However, the focus was on the threats posed by the union and the need to change accession rules. The Polish People's Party emphasized the conditions for the functioning of Polish agriculture within the economies of the European Union countries.

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## POLSKA W PROCESIE INTEGRACJI EUROPEJSKIEJ: UWARUNKOWANIA I PRZEBIEG KAMPANII PRZED REFERENDUM AKCESYJNYM

**Abstrakt:** Celem artykułu jest analiza uwarunkowań i przebieg kampanii przed referendum akcesyjnym w Polsce. Przedmiotem analizy były akty prawne, dokumenty (programy partii politycznych i różnych podmiotów publicznych oraz przemówienia przywódców), dane statystyczne, badania opinii publicznej i opracowania naukowe. Proces badawczy obejmował pogłębioną analizę aktów prawnych, dokumentów i raportów, oraz krytyczną analizę treści. Artykuł został podzielony na kilkanaście części odnoszących się do kwestii stosunku polskiego społeczeństwa wobec akcesji z UE; polskiej sceny politycznej po wyborach parlamentarnych w roku 2001; założeń kampanii informacyjnej; prawnych podstaw kampanii referendalnej; kampanii referendalnych prowadzonych przez prezydenta, rząd, Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, Unię Pracy, Platformę Obywatelską, Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, Inicjatywy i ruchy obywatelskie, Ligę Polskich Rodzin, Samoobronę RP, Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe.

**Słowa kluczowe:** referendum, Unia Europejska, kampania referendalna

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